Abstract. Works on temporal relations between two eventualities e1 and e2 always suppose that e1 = e2. We will concentrate on cases where e1 = e2, i.e. on event coreference. Unlike object coreference, event coreference has rarely been studied in detail, except for (pro)nominal phrases referring to an event. We focus here on event coreference between two sentences. This study will put forward unusual linguistic phenomena, e.g. coreference between existentially quantified elements. These phenomena, which question well-established myths, have to be taken into account in text understanding and text generation. They will lead us to introduce and define new discourse relations which will be discussed in the framework of SDRT.
Introduction
Works on temporal relations between two eventualities e 1 and e 2 examine exclusively if one of the eventuality precedes, includes or overlaps the other one (Moens and Steedman, 1988; Asher, 1993; Pustejovsky, 1995) . All these temporal relations suppose that e 1 = e 2 . We will concentrate on cases where e 1 = e 2 , i.e. on event coreference.
Unlike object coreference, coreference between events has hardly been studied in detail, except for a (pro)nominal phrase referring to an event, see among others (Webber, 1988; Asher, 1993) . Nevertheless, there is a number of other cases of event coreference since the description of an event e can be of three types: it is either a (pro)nominal phrase, or a sentence or an abstraction which is not linguistically realized. This last case occurs when e is a sub-event of a complex event. The number of potential cases of event coreference between two successive descriptions D 1 and D 2 of the same event e is therefore 3 2 = 9. This paper concentrates on event coreference for cases where D 1 and D 2 are both sentences (noted as S i ) as in (1) and (2) 1 .
(1) Fred took care of a tree. He pruned a cedar.
(2) Fred pruned a cedar. Therefore, he took care of a tree.
We will assume that a sentence S i refers to a single event e i 2 . This means that we will study S 1 . S 2 . discourses such that S 1 and S 2 refer to the same single event e.
Studying event coreference requires the definition of two types of coreference relation according to the quantity of information conveyed:
Two successive descriptions D 1 and D 2 of the same entity x (event or object) are in a particularization relation noted as D 2 = PART(D 1 ) iff D 2 conveys some new information about x when compared to the information known from D 1 .
Two successive descriptions D 1 and D 2 of the same entity x (event or object) are in a generalization relation noted as D 2 = GEN(D 1 ) iff D 2 does not bring any new information about x.
Let us illustrate these two types of coreference with the well known case where x is an object. D 1 et D 2 are then (pro)nominal phrases. In (3a), the demonstrative NP this New York girl = PART(an actress). In (3b), the pronoun she = GEN(an actress) and in (3c) the definite or demonstrative NP the / this artist = GEN(an actress) since artist is a hyperonym of actress.
(3) a. Fred had a drink with an actress. This New York girl irritates Mary.
b. Fred had a drink with an actress. She irritates Mary.
c. Fred had a drink with an actress. The / This artist irritates Mary.
In the next sections, we will show that the event coreference relation is of type particularization in (1), of type generalization in (2). We will provide a linguistic study of these discourses and formalize the data in the framework of SDRT (Asher, 1993) .
Notation:
The symbol X r i with i = 1 or 2 denotes the predicate or an argument or modifier in S i with the role r; for an argument r = agent, patient,... ; for a modifier r = time, location,... ; for the predicate, r is irrelevant.
Particularizing and generalizing restatement discourses

Particularizing discourses
A particularization event coreference relation as defined above is to be found in "particularizing discourses" (henceforth PDs) such as (1) or (4).
(4) Fred damaged a garment. He stained a shirt.
In (4), the same event is described in both sentences, with more information in S 2 . S 2 particularizes S 1 since its predicate is a hyponym of the predicate in S 1 (stain < damage) and the (indefinite) object is a hyponym of the (indefinite) object in S 1 (shirt < garment), while its subject is a (pronominal) anaphor of the subject in S 1 3 . The discourse in (4) (when understood as a complete discourse) can only be interpreted as a PD with a particularization event coreference relation. If two events were involved, it would be explicitly indicated either by a cue phrase or by two different adjuncts: in (5a), next implies that e 1 < e 2 ; in (5b), also implies that e 1 = e 2 ; in (5c), the two adjuncts yesterday and today imply that e 1 < e 2 . We will say that discourses such as (5) include a "marker of non coreferentiality".
(5) a. Fred damaged a garment. Next, he stained a shirt.
b. Fred damaged a garment. He also stained a shirt.
c. Fred damaged a garment yesterday. He stained a shirt today.
The particularization interpretation of (4) can be explicitly marked, as in (6) with the cue phrase more precisely (which can be called a "marker of coreferentiality").
(6) Fred damaged a garment. More precisely, he stained a shirt.
Note however that a third sentence pursuing (4) may alter the interpretation of the two first sentences. In (7) with also in S 3 , also is implicitly understood in S 2 , therefore S 1 and S 2 do not refer to the same event.
In the rest of this paper, only discourses with two sentences considered as complete discourses will be studied.
(7) Fred damaged a garment. He stained a shirt. He also tore a tie.
The PD in (4) gives raise to an unusual phenomenon: the two indefinite NPs a garment and a shirt are coreferent. This is unusual since it is generally admitted (Kamp and Reyle, 1993; Corblin, 1995) that an indefinite NP has an existential reading (i.e. introduces a new discourse referent) and therefore that two indefinite NPs are not coreferent 4 . This is the case in (8) in which two garments are involved, whereas only one garment is involved in (4). We will see in Section 6 how to compute the coreference of two indefinite NPs in PDs such as (4).
(8) Fred stained a garment. Joe tore a shirt.
A discourse such as (4) in which at least one element in S 2 specifies a corresponding element in S 1 is called a "PD by specification". Another type of PD is given in (9). In (9), the modifier during dinner in S 2 provides temporal information about e; the other elements X r 2 in S 2 anaphorize or repeat the corresponding elements X r 1 in S 1 .
(9) Fred stained a shirt. He stained it during dinner.
A discourse such as (9) in which at least one element X r 2 in S 2 has no corresponding element X r 1 in S 1 is called a "PD by adjunction". Specification and adjunction may be combined in a single PD. In (10), a shirt specifies a garment and the time adjunct in S 2 has no corresponding element in S 1 .
(10) Fred stained a garment. He stained a shirt during dinner.
At face value, one gets a PD based on lexical knowledge when each element X r 2 in S 2 is either a hyponym, an anaphor or a repetition of a corresponding element X r 1 in S 1 or has no corresponding element X r 1 in S 1 .
More natural examples of PDs are observed when extralinguistic knowledge is at stake, (11). These PDs are based on an extension of hyperonymy, namely X compliment Y > X tell Y that Y is pretty in (11a), and X be sick > X have the flu in (11b). These extended hyperonymy relations rely on cultural or encyclopedic knowledge. However, as our study is not a lexical semantic study, we will stick to artificial examples of PDs based on pure (non debatable) lexical knowledge, avoiding thereby the noise that would be introduced by discussions on the notion of extended hyperonymy.
(11) a. Fred complimented Sue. He told her that she is pretty.
b. Fred is sick. He has the flu.
Our linguistic study is thus not corpus based. Nevertheless it is easy to find real examples of PDs, such as (12a) found in (Asher, 1993) To summarize, in text understanding, it has to be computed that there is only one garment and one event involved in (4) 5 . In text generation, it must be determined under which conditions a discourse such as (4) may be uttered and which linguistic forms should be produced (Roussarie, 2000) . In order to help solving these questions, we will present a linguistic study which states under which conditions a PD occurs.
Generalizing restatement discourses
A generalization event coreference relation as defined in Section 1 is to be found in "generalizing restatement discourses" (henceforth GDs) such as (13).
(13) a. Fred stained a shirt. Therefore, he damaged a garment.
b. Fred murdered Sue. Therefore, he committed a crime.
While a PD stands mainly at the informational level, a GD stands mainly at the intentional level: the first sentence in (13a) or (13b) describes what the speaker wants the hearer to know about an event e, the second one consists in her restatement of e. By definition, a restatement cannot bring new information, but it can present an event in a new light, for example, if the speaker has the intention to forge links with other data, (14). (14) Fred murdered Sue. Therefore, he committed a crime for which he will be brought before the assizes.
(13a) is created from (4) by reversing the order of the sentences (and the anaphoric relations), and by introducing a cue phrase like therefore, with an epistemic value (Rossari and Jayez, 1996) . S 2 generalizes S 1 because damage and garment are respectively hyperonyms of the corresponding elements in S 1 . In (13b), S 2 generalizes S 1 because the complex predicate commit a crime is a hyperonym of murder.
At face value, one gets a GD based on lexical knowledge when each element X r 2 in S 2 is a hyperonym, an anaphor or a repetition of a corresponding element X r 1 in S 1 . As for PDs, more natural examples of GDs are observed when an extended notion of hyperonymy is at stake, (15). However, we will stick to GDs based on lexical knowledge.
(15) a. Fred told Mary that she is pretty. Therefore, he complimented her.
b. Fred has the flu. Therefore, he is sick.
2.3. S 1 . S 2 . discourses with an event coreference
In the rest of this paper, a discourse which does not involve an event coreference relation will be marked with the # sign, whether it sounds incoherent or it has an interpretation without event coreference. In PDs and GDs, each element X r 2 in S 2 which has a corresponding element X r 1 in S 1 stands in a lexico-semantic relation (hyponymy, hyperonymy, anaphor, identity or synonymy 6 ) with that corresponding 6 PD and GD examples which involve the synonymy relation will not be illustrated in this paper. The reader will check that our conclusions stay valid for those examples, even with converse pairs of synonyms (receive and give), (i) and (ii).
(i) Mary received a present from Fred. He gave her a necklace.
(ii) Fred gave Mary a necklace. Therefore, she received a present from him. -Kluwer.tex; 11/11/2003; 14:50; p.6 element. They are the only two kinds of S 1 . S 2 . discourses in which both sentences refer to the same event.
IWCS
− First, if one (or more) element(s) in S 2 with a corresponding element in S 1 is not in a lexico-semantic relation with that corresponding element, the two sentences cannot refer to the same event: this is the case for (16a) with the two predicates stain and tear, for (16b) with the two objects a shirt and a tie, and for (16c) with the two time adjuncts yesterday and today.
(16) a. # Fred stained a shirt. He tore it.
b. # Fred stained a shirt. He stained a tie.
c. # Fred kissed Sue yesterday. He kissed her today.
− Secondly, if each element in S 2 is in a lexico-semantic relation with a corresponding element in S 1 , but if one element is in the hyponymic relation whereas another one is in the hyperonymic relation, the two sentences cannot refer to the same event. In (17a) or (17b), in which the predicate in S 2 is a hyponym of the predicate in S 1 , stain < damage, while the (indefinite) object in S 2 is a hyperonym of the (indefinite) object in S 1 , garment > shirt, no event coreference is involved. However, we will see in Section 5.2 that some PDs include both hyperonyms and hyponyms in S 2 .
(17) a. # Fred damaged a shirt. He stained a garment.
b. # Fred damaged a shirt. Therefore, he stained a garment.
− Finally, the two sentences should not bring the same amount of information or the same view on the information conveyed. Repeating in S 2 the information conveyed in S 1 , as in (18a) or (18b), leads to an incoherent discourse. Therefore, two directions are available: either bringing new information, that is the role of PDs, or restating the information in more general terms so as to forge links with other data, that is the role of GDs.
(18) a. # Fred stained a shirt. He stained it.
b. # Fred stained a shirt. Therefore, he stained it.
Hypothesis
From these observations, the following hypothesis can be put forward:
An event coreference relation is found in a S 1 . S 2 . discourse only if:
− either each element in S 2 is a hyponym, anaphor or repetition of a corresponding element in S 1 if any (a particularization relation is then involved), − or if each element in S 2 (introduced by a cue phrase like therefore) is a hyperonym, anaphor or repetition of a corresponding element in S 1 (a generalization relation is then involved).
This hypothesis can be seen in terms of "implication":
− In PDs, S 2 "implies" S 1 : informally, staining a shirt implies damaging a garment, so Fred stained a shirt implies Fred damaged a garment in (4).
− In GDs, S 1 "implies" S 2 : informally, in (13a) Fred stained a shirt implies Fred damaged a garment.
In the next section, we are going to provide, in the framework of DRT (Kamp and Reyle, 1993) , a formal definition of this notion of "implication" between two DRSs. In Section 4, we will show that the conditions to observe a GD consisting of two sentences are based on an implication relation between the DRSs associated with the two sentences. On the other hand, we will see in Section 5 that the matter is more complex for PDs.
Implication between two DRSs
In logical terms, a hyponymy relation between nouns such as cedar < tree translates into:
Therefore, the following implication is valid:
Similarly, a hyponymy relation between verbs such as prune < take care (of ) leads to: ∀u, v ∃e 1 prune(e 1 , u, v) ⇒ ∃e 2 take-care-of(e 2 , u, v)
And an (extended) hyponymy relation between adverbials such as this morning < today (this morning = today in the morning) leads to:
We will also use the following implication which is always true:
For example: ∃e 1 prune(e 1 , f, x) ∧ lovingly(e 1 ) ⇒ ∃e 1 prune(e 1 , f, x) Finally, in order to deal with anaphora, we use implication schemes such as :
∃x F red(x) ⇒ ∃y human(y) ∧ male(y)
From these logical implications, we can define an implication relation between two DRSs, noted as ⇒, when the lexical predicates in the conditions are in hyponymy relations. Without going into formal details, this implication relation is illustrated in the following example in which k 1 corresponds to Fred lovingly pruned a cedar this morning and k 1 to He took care of a tree today.
k 1 e 1 , f, x prune(e 1 , f, x) cedar(x) lovingly(e 1 ) this-morning(e 1 ) e 1 < n f = F red ⇒ k 1 e 2 , y, z take-care-of(e 2 , y, z) tree(z) today(e 2 ) e 2 < n human(y) male(y) y =?
Note that such conditions as y =? in k 1 are ignored. Of course, two DRSs that only differ in the names of their bound variables are considered as identical (this identity relation is noted as ∼ =).
Conditions for GDs
We are going to show that the conditions for a GD consisting of two sentences are the following:
C GD A discourse consisting of two sentences is a GD iff (i) S 2 includes possibly an epistemic cue phrase such as therefore 7 , and (ii) the DRSs k 1 and k 2 associated respectively with S 1 and S 2 are such that
C GD is obviously respected in a basic example of GD, (2) repeated in (19).
(19) Fred pruned a cedar. Therefore, he took care of a tree.
The condition ¬k 1 ∼ = k 2 is necessary to rule out such examples as (18b) or (20), in which S 2 repeats the information conveyed in S 1 . For such a case, k 1 ∼ = k 2 .
(20) # Fred pruned a cedar. Therefore, he pruned it.
In examples such as (17b) and (21), which are not GDs, C GD does not hold because the verb in S 2 is a hyponym of the verb in S 1 (prune < take care (of )).
(21) # Fred took care of a cedar. Therefore, he pruned a tree.
Consider now the adjunction of modifiers. In (19), it is possible to insert any adjunct in S 1 while maintaining the generalization interpretation. (22a) with yesterday in S 1 is a GD. k 1 , the DRS for the first sentence in (22a), includes the condition yesterday(e 1 ) without equivalent in k 2 . Therefore, C GD holds in (22a) 8 . Similarly, (22b) with an appreciative modifier in S 1 (lovingly) and no modifier in S 2 is also a GD for which C GD holds.
(22) a. Fred pruned a cedar yesterday. Therefore, he took care of a tree.
b. Fred lovingly pruned a cedar. Therefore, he took care of a tree.
It is possible to insert an adjunct in S 2 only if it generalizes an adjunct in S 1 . (23a) with this morning in S 1 and today in S 2 is a GD. As this morning can be viewed as a hyponym of today, C GD holds for (23a). On the other hand, (23b) with yesterday in S 2 and no time adjunct in S 1 is not a GD and C GD does not hold for (23b).
(23) a. Fred pruned a cedar this morning. Therefore he took care of a tree today.
b. # Fred pruned a cedar. Therefore he took care of a tree yesterday.
The reader will check that GDs based on extended hyponymy relations, (15), are such that C GD holds.
Conditions for PDs
We are first going to examine PDs with a corresponding GD, i.e. PDs such as a GD can be created by reversing the order of the sentences and the anaphoric relations (and by introducing a cue phrase such as therefore). The conditions to observe such PDs, namely C P D , are symmetrical to C GD and are therefore based on the notion of implications between the DRSs representing the two sentences. Next, we will examine PDs with no corresponding GD, for which no implication between the DRSs of the two sentences is involved.
PDs with a corresponding GD
The conditions to observe a PD with a corresponding GD are the following:
C P D A discourse consisting of two sentences is a PD if (i) S 2 includes no marker of non coreferentiality (see Section 2.1) but includes possibly a marker of coreferentiality, and (ii) the DRSs k 1 and k 2 associated respectively with S 1 and S 2 are such that k 2 ⇒ k 2 with k 2 ∼ = k 1 ( and
The examples in (24) are all PDs with a corresponding GD, respectively (19), (22a), (22b) and (23a). C P D holds for these discourses as C GD holds for the corresponding GDs. 
PDs with no corresponding GD
The first type of PD examples with no corresponding GD is illustrated in (25a): (25a) is a PD (the two sentences refer to the same event with more information in S 2 ) while the discourse obtained by reversing the order of the sentences and the anaphoric relations, namely (23b) repeated in (25b), is not a GD. C P D does not hold in (25a) in the same way as C GD does not hold in (25b).
(25) a. Fred took care of a tree yesterday. He pruned a cedar.
b. # Fred pruned a cedar. Therefore, he took care of a tree yesterday.
S 1 in (25a) includes a time adjunct (yesterday) which is not repeated in S 2 , although it is understood that the pruning event occurred yesterday and that it is the same event as the taking care event. This means that the second sentence of a PD has to bring new information but has not to repeat all the information conveyed in the first sentence. On the other hand, the second sentence of a GD cannot bring new information at all. The second type of PD examples with no corresponding GD is illustrated in (26a): (26a) is a PD although the verb in S 2 is an hyperonym of the verb in S 1 . It has no corresponding GD - (26b) is not a GD -and C P D does not hold. (26a) is paraphrased by (26c) with the anaphoric form do it. In (26a) or (26c), the new information in S 2 comes from the adverbial today, which cannot be omitted: discourses in (27) without such an adverbial are unacceptable. in (28c). These examples are not clearly understood with an event coreference relation, although this interpretation is not excluded (with a specific prosody, e.g. emphasis on today in (28a) and (28b), on cedar in (28c)), hence the ? sign in front of them. The coreferential interpretation can be enforced with the marker of coreferentiality more precisely, (28d). Given these PD examples with no corresponding GD, one could think that the condition for a PD is that each element X r 2 in S 2 has to be in a lexico-semantic relation with X r 1 in S 1 (if any), whatever this relation may be (hyperonymy as well as hyponymy, anaphora, identity or synonymy). Such a condition for a PD can be intuitively formulated in terms of "unification" of the two corresponding DRSs. For example, in (28c), the unification of the DRSs of the two sentences is possible and gives the DRS for Fred pruned a cedar (today) gathering the hyponyms of one or the other sentence. A unification condition supposes that the order of the sentences is not relevant as long as S 2 brings new information compared to the information conveyed from S 1 . And in fact, there exist examples of PDs in which the order of the sentences can be reversed: (29a) and (29b), which differ by the order of the sentences (and the anaphoric relations), are both quite natural PDs with walk < go. (29a) is a PD in which S 2 brings the information that Fred walked to the station and that this walk took one hour. (29b) is a PD in which S 2 brings the information that Fred's walk lead him to the station 9 .
(29) a. Fred went to the station. He walked for one hour.
b. Fred walked for one hour. He went to the station. Nevertheless, a "unification" based condition for PDs does not work: (17a) or (30a), in which Pred 2 is a hyponym of Pred 1 (prune < take care of ), while Arg patient 2 is a hyperonym of Arg patient 1 (tree > cedar ), is definitively not a PD: it cannot be understood as involving a single event (and a single tree). The insertion of a marker of coreferentiality does not help: (30b) with more precisely sounds incoherent. Yet, in (30a), the unification of the DRSs of the two sentences is possible and gives the DRS for Fred pruned a cedar (today), as it is the case for (28c). The contrast between (28c) and (30a) should be explained.
(30) a. # Fred took care of a cedar. He pruned a tree (today).
b. # Fred took care of a cedar. More precisely, he pruned a tree.
In conclusion, the condition C P D is limited to PDs with a corresponding GD. There exist other PDs with no corresponding GD for which C P D does not hold. In those PDs, S 2 may include a hyperonym of a corresponding element in S 1 . However, the presence of hyperonyms in S 2 is constrained. As a consequence, a unification based condition is too weak. It should at least be stated that an indefinite argument in S 2 cannot be a hyperonym of the corresponding argument in S 1 when Pred 2 is a hyponym of Pred 1 (so as to rule out (30)). In any case, it is clear that the conditions to observe PDs are based on linguistic knowledge. We note C part these conditions.
Before ending this section on PDs, a remark on the notion of "new information" coming from demonstratives NPs.
Demonstrative NPs in PDs
In all the examples we have presented so far, Arg or an indefinite NP (as in (31a)). We are now going to examine cases where Arg patient 2 is a definite NP, (31b), or a demonstrative NP, (31c). The examples with a demonstrative NP are in French since a French demonstrative NP may translate into a definite NP in English, an issue which is out of the topic here. (31b) is an acceptable PD only in a context where a unique cedar exists. (31c) is an acceptable PD only in a deictic use of the demonstrative NP (the speaker points to a particular cedar). In a non deictic use, (31c) is not a PD and is incoherent. From now on, the deictic use of demonstrative NPs is put aside, only the anaphoric use is considered. The coreference between the two patients is of type generalization in (32a) since arbre (tree) is a hyperonym of cèdre (cedar) (cet arbre = GEN (un cèdre)). On the other hand, it is of type particularization both in in (32b) and (32c). In (32b), the explicative relative clause brings new information (cet arbre, qui est très vieux, = PART (un cèdre)). In (32c), the head noun of Arg patient 2 being a hyponym of the head noun in Arg patient 1 brings new information (ce cèdre = PART (un arbre)) 10 . However, whatever the type of coreference between the two patients (generalization or particularization), the presence of yesterday is mandatory in all the examples of (32) (see the contrast between (32c) and (31c)). This amounts to saying that even when an anaphoric demonstrative NP brings new information on the entity it refers to, it does not bring new information on the event involved. This contrasts with indefinite NPs: in (31a), a cedar brings new information about the tree involved and this information is considered new in what concerns the pruning event. Similarly for definite NPs, (31b).
In summary, a distinction should be made between new information on an entity x in itself and new information on an entity x as being a participant in an eventuality.
Discourse Relations
It is likely that anybody working on discourse relations would lay down that the discourse relation between the two sentences of a PD is Elaboration. However, we are going to show that it is necessary to postulate the existence of a new discourse relation, called "Particularization", which implies an event coreference relation. Beforehand, a terminology remark: "particularization" (abbreviated as PART) designates a type of coreference as defined in Section 1; "Particularization" designates a discourse relation between two sentences. These two notions are linked in SDRT (Asher, 1993) in the following way where π i is the label for the DRS k i representing the sentence S i :
Elaboration is defined in various ways (Hobbs, 1979; Mann and Thompson, 1988; Asher and Lascarides, 1995) , but whatever its definition, this discourse relation does not imply an event coreference relation. Let us illustrate this point with a "classical" example of Elaboration, (33a) or its shorter version, (33b). The first sentence denotes an event e 1 which is "elaborated" in the next sentence(s) which bring(s) new information on one or some stages (sub-events) of e 1 . No event coreference is at stake: a trip by plane cannot be reduced to a takeoff and a landing and even less to a simple takeoff. There exists a number of stages in the trip which are described neither in (33a) nor in (33b). Yet it is necessary to postulate the existence of a discourse relation (Particularization) which implies an event coreference relation. In the framework of SDRT, the indefeasible consequence of Particularization is written in the following way:
Only such a discourse relation allows us to preserve well established insights on discourse referents. The argumentation is the following: examples such as (1) or (4) are productive counter-examples to the principle of the existential reading of an indefinite NP (which entails that two indefinite NPs are not coreferent). Hence, two solutions towards this principle are available:
− Given these productive counter-examples, this principle is abandoned and an anaphoric reading of indefinite NPs is proposed to allow the coreference of two indefinite NPs. This solution does not seem appropriate since this principle is nearly always true except in PDs (and in GDs and in some well known exceptions given in note 4).
− This principle is not abandoned. The two indefinite NPs in (1) are given an existential reading: two discourse referents x and y with the complete conditions tree(x) and cedar(y) are introduced. The coreference relation x = y is established thanks to the discourse relation Particularization. This discourse relation implies an event coreference relation which implies in turn that the arguments with the same role are coreferent. In other words, it is because Particularization is established between the two sentences of (1) that it is known that the two sentences refer to the same event and therefore that the two patients a tree and a cedar are coreferent, i.e. x = y.
This last solution seems better. It raises the following question: how can it be established that the discourse relation in (1) is Particularization (which amounts to establishing that (1) is a PD)? The answer to this question lies in linguistic knowledge: the two sentences in a PD follow some strong linguistic constraints which have been described in Section 5. This set of constraints, noted as C part , allows the computation of the discourse relation Particularization. In SDRT, the rule is the following (where > is the symbol for the default implication):
(τ, π 1 , π 2 ) ∧ C part > Particularization(π 1 , π 2 )
To sum up, it is necessary to postulate the existence of a new discourse relation, Particularization, which implies an event coreference relation between the event e 1 described in the first sentence and the event described in the second sentence. This discourse relation differs from Elaboration for which only one or some stages (sub-events) of e 1 are specified. Nevertheless, Particularization can be seen as a particular case of Elaboration. Along the same lines, it seems necessary for GDs to postulate the existence of a new discourse relation, Generalization, which implies an event coreference relation and which can be seen as a particular case of Restatement.
Conclusion
Unlike object coreference, event coreference is an issue which has not been really examined (except for (pro)nominal phrases anaphorizing sentences). However, event coreference is a central notion for several types of discourses. This paper focusses on particularizing and generalizing discourses. In (Danlos, 2000; Danlos and Gaiffe, 2000) , we have shown that the particularization event coreference relation is involved in some causal discourses analyzed with the discourse relation "Explanation", while generalization is involved in some causal discourses with "Result". Therefore, event coreference is a cohesion issue (coreference), see (Halliday and Hasan, 1976) , which turns out to be crucial for a coherence issue (establishment of discourse relations).
We have shown that event coreference in PDs requires a new discourse relation, Particularization, more specific than Elaboration which is usually used to analyze discourses such as (1). Particularization (and its dual relation Generalization) is established on the basis of strong linguistic constraints (lexico-semantic constraints on the elements with the same role). It allows the establishment of an event coreference relation although the events denoted by the sentences are existentially quantified. This event coreference relation implies the coreference of participants with the same thematic role, even if they are existentially quantified.
